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Red, White, and Kind of Blue? The 
Conservatives and the Americanization of 
Canadian Constitutional Culture, by David 
Schneiderman1
JOSEPH MCDONALD2
IN THE 2010 CASE OF Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, a narrow 5–4 
majority of the United States Supreme Court overturned decades of jurisprudence 
by striking down any limitation on what corporations can spend on indirect 
electioneering.3 While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms upholds a 
similarly robust protection of political speech under its freedom of expression 
provision, an analogous case at the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in 2004 
resulted in a much different outcome.4
In Harper v Canada,5 Stephen Harper, then president of the National 
Citizens Coalition (Harper later became the Prime Minister of Canada in 2006), 
launched a constitutional challenge in June 2000, arguing that sections 350 and 
351 of the Canada Elections Act amounted to an unconstitutional infringement 
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015)
2. Student-at-Law, JD (Osgoode), MA (Carleton), Hons BA (McMaster).
3. Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010).
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b) [Charter].
5. 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 SCR 827 [Harper].
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on the fundamental freedom related to expression.6 These sections of the 
Canada Elections Act placed limitions on the amount of money a third party 
could contribute to an election campaign. While the SCC did find that these 
provisions violated individual freedom of expression protected under the Charter, 
it determined that the infringement was justified due to the legislation’s pressing 
and substantial objective of preserving fair and equitable elections.7
In an address to the Canadian Parliament in 1961, as regards to the 
Canadian-American relationship, President John F. Kennedy said: “What 
unites us is far greater than what divides us.”8 In revisiting this statement in the 
context of the two countries’ respective constitutional cultures, what divides us is 
actually much clearer than what unites us. Although the US Bill of Rights and the 
Canadian Charter are textually quite similar, judicial interpretation of the rights 
contained within them is crucial to understanding our differences.9
In Red, White, and Kind of Blue? The Conservatives and the Americanization 
of Canadian Constitutional Culture, David Schneiderman presents a bold, 
comprehensive overview of the impact Stephen Harper’s government had on 
Canada’s parliamentary system, its conventions, and culture. The work illustrates 
an attempt at the “presidentialization of prime ministerial authority” by taking 
its reader through constitutional crises (e.g., prorogation), and common practices 
(e.g., appointment of senators and Supreme Court justices). This review will 
similarly explore these areas.
While textual similarities between the US Bill of Rights and the Canadian 
Charter are evident in several areas, the practical differences between the two 
regimes are rather stark. Schneiderman begins by describing the intended 
legislative omnipotence under the Canadian regime compared to the sentiment 
in the United States that excessive concentration of power is a dangerous thing.10 
It is from this launching point that Schneiderman outlines the ways in which 
Canadian constitutional culture is much more centralized compared to that of 
the United States.
6. Although the Conservative Party of Canada under Stephen Harper’s leadership made some 
modifications to the legislation, these sections are largely the same as they were at the time of 
this case. See Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9, ss 350, 351.
7. Harper, supra note 5 at paras 26-27.
8. John F Kennedy, “Address to Canadian Parliament” (Delivered at the House of 
Commons, Ottawa, 17 May 1961), online: <www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/
JFKPOF-034-027.aspx>.
9. See Paul Bender, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Bill 
of Rights: A Comparison” (1983) 28:4 McGill LJ 811.
10. Schneiderman, supra note 1 at 25.
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Schneiderman acknowledges Harper-era efforts to promote the perception 
that the prime minister, not unlike the US president, is an elected, separate, and 
distinct branch of government.11 This would not be the most difficult task for a 
sitting prime minister insofar as over half of Canadians already believe the prime 
minister is directly elected, rather than appointed by the Governor General.12 
Schneiderman argues that in recent times we have seen a further centralisation 
of policy-making, marginalisation of Parliament, and the personalisation of 
leadership—all of which suggest a presidentialisation of Canadian authority 
(i.e., the executive branch).13 Indeed, rebranding federal authority as the “Harper 
Government” is in itself an indication of the administration’s preoccupation 
with agenda-setting.14 Schneiderman goes on to point out that this process of 
presidentialising Canadian authority might actually only be public perception. 
In reality, Canadian constitutional power is already much more centralised 
compared to the United States, and nowhere is this more evident than through 
the government’s use of the prorogation power, perhaps reaching its zenith (or 
nadir, depending on your view) in the prorogation of Parliament by the Harper 
Government throughout its mandate.
I. PROROGUING PARLIAMENT
While the Constitution Act 186715 does articulate separate branches of government, 
including an executive separate from a legislative branch, scholars argue that 
constitutional practice is much different and that these two branches have become 
inextricably fused.16 Peter Hogg, Canada’s preeminent constitutional scholar, has 
gone so far as to say that there simply is no separation of powers in Canada.17 
Schneiderman argues that this separation is more of “a textual façade rather than 
an accurate portrayal of parliamentary practice.”18
The events began innocuously enough. It had been known for some time 
that the handing over of detained persons to Afghan authorities could mean 
11. Ibid at 79.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid at 89.
14. Ibid at 92.
15. The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5.
16. See Schneiderman, supra note 1 at 118.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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torture or death.19 After a motion for the production of documents introduced 
by the Liberal Party passed in Parliament, the Harper Government felt it 
needed to act. Either as a means of avoiding having to comply with the motion 
or, worse, facing contempt of Parliament, it asked the Governor General to 
prorogue Parliament (the second time it had done so in as many years). There 
was considerable outrage at this seemingly callous act; protests took place on 
Parliament Hill, and some called for clear, enforceable rules that would govern 
the practice. However, under the separation of powers concept, a veneer that 
satisfied the majority of the Canadian electorate, the Harper Government would 
not face a constitutional crisis.
While prorogations have been commonplace throughout Canadian 
constitutional history, having occurred no less than 121 times (including Harper’s 
four prorogations), those exercised under the Harper Conservatives appeared to 
be a patent abuse of power as compared to preceding governments. Pierre Trudeau 
exercised his power to prorogue eight times, but almost all of them lasted less than 
a day; Brian Mulroney prorogued twice in nine years, for a total of 64 days; and 
while Jean Chrétien’s last prorogation lasted substantially longer, his first three 
totaled just 37 days.20 Harper’s last two prorogations alone totaled 114 days and 
were the first since 1873 to occur in the context of a Parliamentary controversy.21
These prorogations were not the only element pointing to a much more 
controlling, “presidential” style of Parliament under the Harper-era government. 
The Upper Chamber would be another area where Stephen Harper would 
leave his mark.
II. ELECTING THE SENATE
Equally as consequential as these abusive prorogations during the Harper era 
was the appointment of 18 new Conservative senators to the Upper Chamber, 
including three who have since been disgraced for various misdeeds: Mike Duffy, 
Pamela Wallin, and Patrick Brazeau.22 It was a sudden about-face, as from 2005 
onwards, Harper had refrained from appointing any new senators in the hopes 
of implementing a new provincially administered elections approach. However, 
19. Ibid at 114.
20. Nelson Wiseman, “The use, misuse, and abuse of prorogation,” The 
Hill Times (1 March 2010), online: <www.hilltimes.com/2010/03/01/
the-use-misuse-and-abuse-of-prorogation/13383/23383>.
21. Ibid.
22. Schneiderman, supra note 1 at 176.
MCDONAlD,  ReD, WhIte, AND KIND OF Blue? 337
as Schneiderman explains, the threat of a coalition government resulted in a 
flurry of appointments.23
In this chapter of the book, Schneiderman identifies the different ways in 
which the Harper Government attempted, and largely failed, to mimic American 
congressional politics. With its genesis in Reform Party proposals for a “Triple-E 
Senate”—“elected,” “equal,” and “effective”—Schneiderman argues that the 
Harper Government failed to consider how this kind of reform to the Upper 
Chamber would impact the lower one.24 While the Supreme Court of Canada has 
never assessed whether the Senate actually performs its intended function (i.e., 
the protection of sectional and provincial interests), it has denied the capacity of 
the federal government to unilaterally abolish or replace the body.25
There have been a number of historic inflection points attempting Senate 
Reform, including the failed attempts of the Meech Lake (1987) and Charlottetown 
(1992) Accords. The Harper Government made its own contribution to this 
history. After appointing 18 new senators in 2008, Harper renewed with vigour 
his attempts at institutional reform: the imposition of senatorial term limits and 
“consultative” elections. Had his attempts been successful, the Canadian model 
would have resembled the American Senate more than ever. These aspirations 
came to an end with the 2014 Reference re Senate Reform, where the SCC ruled 
that any amendment that engages provincial interests, including those related 
to the Senate, is beyond the unilateral capacity of the federal government (i.e., 
the power of the federal government to unilaterally amend the constitution).26 
So, while the Harper Government could legislate some of these attempted 
reformations, without entrenching Senate reform into the Constitution any such 
changes would be vulnerable to amendment or repeal after Stephen Harper’s 
tenure as prime minister.27
III. APPOINTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
Another area where the Harper Government attempted to edge Canadian 
constitutional culture closer to that of our neighbours to the south is in the area 
of the judiciary. Schneiderman begins this discussion with an overview of the spat 
23. Ibid at 177.
24. Ibid at 179.
25. See e.g. Re Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54 at 64, 
102 DLR (3d) 1.
26. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
27. Schneiderman, supra note 1 at 225.
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between Stephen Harper and Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin regarding the 
nomination of Justice Marc Nadon. In an unprecedented event, Prime Minister 
Harper and then Justice Minister Peter MacKay publicly criticised Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s decision to inform the prime minister that his potential nomination 
of Justice Nadon may present a legal conflict. Importantly, this advice was 
provided before Nadon was actually appointed. It later came to light that the 
prime minister’s staff at the time had to talk him down “from launching a full, 
public assault on the impartiality of the court.”28
The Supreme Court and Stephen Harper had already not been on the best of 
terms. During his time in office, the SCC struck down a wide range of laws and 
regulations, effectively standing in the way of the Harper Government’s attempts 
at legal reform. These included, but were not limited to, mandatory minimum 
sentencing, credit for prison time served, physician-assisted death, prohibitions 
against sex work, and safe injection sites.29
Since as early as 2006, the Conservatives had attempted to address the tenuous 
relationship between the executive and the judicial branches of government by 
further flirting with American constitutional culture in introducing judicial 
confirmations as part of the appointment process. The Harper Government, 
and Prime Minister Harper himself, were not pleased with what they saw as 
the usurpation of the powers of Parliament by the SCC.30 Whereas the Harper 
Government perceived judicial hearings as a means to combat “judicial activism” 
and its extremes, the legal community feared the overt politicisation of a process 
which should be conducted under a purely legal framing.31
In examining the five nomination processes since 2006, Schneiderman 
finds that they neither served to elicit the judges’ perspectives on law, nor 
served any educational function, generally, for the Canadian people. Ultimately, 
argues Schneiderman, anything that causes people to pay attention to courts, 
even controversial confirmation processes, tends to reinforce the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary—which is a good thing.32 While efforts were made by 
the Harper Government to move towards a US model, the politicisation of the 
judicial appointment process has not been a successful endevour.
28. Tasha Kheiriddin, “Law and Order in the Harper Years” in Jennifer Ditchburn & Graham 
Fox, eds, The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016) 196 at 206.
29. Schneiderman, supra note 1 at 207.
30. Ibid at 208.
31. Ibid at 251.
32. Ibid at 280.
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Schneiderman concludes that despite various Harper Government initiatives, 
including those that have threatened elements of Canadian constitutional culture, 
these efforts have been largely unsuccessful.33 While Schneiderman does not 
argue that we should be moving towards the US model, he does maintain that 
some change is required. He worries about the mass of discretion inherited by the 
prime minister associated with the prerogatives, and the concentration of power 
in the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”). His advice is that of Edmund Burke’s: 
constitutional change in Canada requires a “vigorous mind, steady persevering 
attention, and various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources 
of an understanding fruitful in expedients.”34
Ultimately, Schneiderman offers a clear-eyed perspective on the degree to 
which our Parliamentary democracy compares to the perceived centralisation of 
power in the Office of the President of the United States. In doing so, he exposes 
an important feature of our alleged balance of powers system and points out 
that power may not be as dispersed as our Parliamentary infrastructure suggests. 
Insofar as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals were elected on the promise to 
fragment the power that Stephen Harper concentrated in the PMO, they would 
be well-served in looking back to the previous administration’s approach to these 
formative components of Canada’s constitutional democracy.
33. Ibid at 290-91.
34. Ibid at 295.
